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Bogus, S M, Molenaar, K R and Diekmann, J E (2006) Strategies for overlapping dependent design activities. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 829-37.

Grosskopf, K R and Kibert, C J (2006) Economic incentive framework for sustainable energy use in US residential construction. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 839-46.

Lewis, T M and Hosein, R (2006) An estimation of the size of the hidden labour force in construction in Trinidad and Tobago. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 805-15.

Mattar, M H and Cheah, C Y J (2006) Valuing large engineering projects under uncertainty: private risk effects and real options. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 847-60.

Poh, Y P and Tah, J H M (2006) Integrated duration-cost influence network for modelling risk impacts on construction tasks. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 861-8.

Raidén, A B, Dainty, A R J and Neale, R H (2006) Balancing employee needs, project requirements and organisational priorities in team deployment. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 883-95.

Sacks, R and Harel, M (2006) An economic game theory model of subcontractor resource allocation behaviour. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 869-81.

  • Type: Journal Article
  • Keywords: Decision making; game theory; lean construction; partnering; resource allocation; subcontracting
  • ISBN/ISSN: 0144-6193
  • URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190600631856
  • Abstract:

    Periodic review and adjustment of resource allocations to construction projects is critical for subcontractors to maintain profitability under traditional unit price or lump sum contracts. Project managers strive to control subcontractors in an effort to meet budgets and schedules; subcontractors often work on multiple projects simultaneously and strive independently to allocate resources to those projects where they perceive that they will bring maximum utility. An economic game theory model is proposed as a foundation for understanding the behaviour of subcontractors in allocating resources to projects. The model describes the influence of the degree of reliability of the planned schedule on subcontractors’ and project managers’ behaviours under traditional unit price contracting. Unreliable plans undermine efforts to promote cooperative behaviour.

Skitmore, M and Runeson, G (2006) Bidding models: testing the stationarity assumption. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 791-803.

Zhang, S B and Liu, A M M (2006) Organisational culture profiles of construction enterprises in China. Construction Management and Economics, 24(08), 817-28.